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DERRIDA’S POLITICAL EMOTIONS 
 
ABSTRACT 
The recent “affective turn” in the humanities and social sciences has often been viewed as a turn 
away from the kind of textualist or constructivist approaches associated with poststructuralism. 
Eagerness to get beyond such approaches is usually rooted in a belief in the inability of linguistic 
models to account for the principally biological or materialist category of “affect.” This article takes 
issue with this view, showing how affect is in fact central to Derridean deconstruction, notably its 
conception of the political. Despite meticulous analyses of mourning, grief, nostalgia, love, disgust, 
and jealousy, however, Derrida’s contribution to the theory of the emotions has rarely been examined 
in its own right. The article traces the evolution of two affects—desire and anxiety—which it argues 
are fundamental to the psychical economy of the unsettled subject of deconstruction. For Derrida, 
the affectionate bonds which tie us to ourselves and to others are always accompanied by anxiety in 
the face of incalculable loss or destruction. While this paradox emerges in dialogue with 
psychoanalysis’s theory of the affects, it has important implications for the “politics of 
deconstruction,” considered here as an attempt to think through the structural contamination of affect 
and technics. 
 
* * * 
 
According to a journalistic commonplace, the events of 11 September 2001 brought an abrupt end to 
the age of postmodernism. The argument usually runs something like this: in a world where polysemy 
and relativism held glamorous sway, the collapse of the Twin Towers represented the noisy intrusion 
of the real, a timely wake-up call for a civilization struggling with the burden of near-permanent 
ironic detachment. Here, if ever, was an event calling for univocal condemnation, for an ethical 
response founded on universal values of truth, justice, and the good. This view was neatly 
encapsulated by Roger Rosenblatt in an article published in Time magazine less than a fortnight after 
the attacks:  
 
 One good thing could come from this horror: it could spell the end of the age of   
 irony. For some 30 years—roughly as long as the Twin Towers were upright—the 
 good folks in charge of America's intellectual life have insisted that nothing was to   be 
believed in  or taken seriously. Nothing was real [...]. The ironists, seeing through  
 everything, made it  difficult for anyone to see anything [...]. The planes that plowed  
 into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were real. The flames, smoke, sirens  —
real. The chalky landscape, the silence of the streets—all real. I feel your pain—  really.1 
 
Rosenblatt’s argument rehearses two charges levelled against postmodernism in the aftermath of 9/11. 
On the one hand, postmodernism was attacked for cultivating irony as its presiding sensibility, for its 
cynical disengagement from the harsher realities (social, political, economic) of life under late 
capitalism. At the same time, critics rounded on postmodernism’s active discoloration of emotional 
life, its loosening of the affective bonds which normally assure our attachment to these realities. In 
the wake of the physical and emotional damage wrought by the attacks, these characteristics had 
allegedly been exposed as intellectually glib, if not politically pernicious. 
 This caricatured version of postmodernist and poststructuralist thought rests, at least in part, 
on an argument for the inability of these approaches to account for authentic emotional experience 
(“I feel your pain—really”).2 According to Frederic Jameson’s well-worn soundbite, postmodernity 
entails a “waning” of affect: not the disappearance of affectivity per se, but the steady evacuation of 
                                               
1 Roger Rosenblatt, “The Age of Irony Comes to an End,” in Time, 24 September, 2001. 
2 The distinction between postmodernist and poststructuralist approaches is a significant one, but my concern here is with 
their conflation in popular and critical discourse. 
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meaning from our collective emotional lives, “the emergence of a new kind of flatness or 
depthlessness.”3 Although Jameson’s claim has endured much critical pummelling in recent years—
waning, we might even say, has been replaced by a whining of affect—, presumptions regarding the 
incapacity of (post)structuralist-textualist approaches to deal seriously with emotion remain 
stubbornly fixed, notably in more materialist or Deleuzean-Spinozist currents of affect theory.4 As 
Ruth Leys and more recently Eugenie Brinkema have pointed out, affect theorists are often keen to 
assert their “post-post” credentials by adopting a rhetoric of negation (affect theory is not semiotics, 
not textualism, neither structuralist nor post-structuralist) and critique (we must interrogate the 
affective unthought of “Theory” by returning to a more primary experience of affect as 
“autonomous”). In making such claims, however, theorists of affect all too often leave undisturbed a 
host of theoretical, scientific, and aesthetic assumptions regarding the transcendental priority of affect 
over meaning, or experience over language. 5  This eagerness to get beyond 
poststructuralist/postmodernist paradigms is usually rooted in a belief in the essential incompatibility 
of affect’s immediacy with poststructuralism’s suspicion of the category of “experience.” The 
obvious corollary of which is that affect theory risks in the same stroke falling back into the very 
categories of “immediacy” and “self-evidence” which these supposedly faded paradigms began by 
calling into question. 
 One theorist who studiously avoids this risk is Rei Terada, whose Feeling in Theory offers a 
compelling account of what a poststructuralist approach to the emotions might look like. 6 
Reconstructing an implicit affective framework from Derrida’s early work, Terada argues for the 
inextricability of “feeling” (emotion in its cognitive and physiological forms) from a decentered view 
of subjectivity. Her study effectively inverts Jameson’s argument for the waning of affect by asserting 
that “the classical picture of emotion already contraindicates the idea of the subject.”7 This is done 
by rejecting the “expressive hypothesis” (emotions are the tangible exteriorization of an interior, self-
present content) and showing, a contrario, that there can be no “classical” or self-identical subject 
precisely because there are emotions in the first place. For Derrida, Terada argues, emotions are the 
disturbing residue of the subject’s inability to coincide with its own representations, “the remainder 
that keeps the literal and the figural from matching.”8  
  While admirable in its pursuit of a model that is mostly allusive in Derrida’s early reading of 
Rousseau and Husserl, Terada’s partial corpus leaves several crucial aspects of deconstruction’s 
theory of the emotions unexplored. In this article, I will focus on two such elements: politics and 
technology. The latter, I argue, are indispensable to a comprehensive account of Derridean emotion 
and to any genuine attempt to test its contribution to our understanding of what emotions are, how 
they work, and what role they play in the wider cultural sphere. Here I make two principal claims. 
First, that Derrida consistently articulates emotion and the political by way of a deconstruction of the 
classical opposition between the private (or personal) and the public (or political). For Derrida the 
emotions—or to use a term he invokes far more frequently, the “affects”—are not merely secondary 
                                               
3 Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham & London: Duke University 
Press, 1991), 9.  
4 The term “affect theory” is used here in its broadest sense, to encompass a plurality of approaches (biological, materialist, 
theoretical, cultural, aesthetic) to the problem of emotional experience. What unites these varied models, however 
perilously, is an impersonal view of affect, i.e. one which stresses its immediate, bio-physiological characteristics before 
its secondary subjective or cultural ramifications. For a useful “history” of affect theory, see Gregory J. Seigworth and 
Melissa Gregg, “An Inventory of Shimmers” in The Affect Theory Reader, ed. Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 1–26.  
5 Brian Massumi, “The Autonomy of Affect” in Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham & 
London: Duke University Press, 2002), 23-45. For a vigorous critique of this autonomy, see Ruth Leys, “The Turn to 
Affect: A Critique”, Critical Inquiry, 27 (Spring 2011), 434-472; and Eugenie Brinkema’s “Ten Points to Begin” in The 
Forms of the Affects (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2014), xi-xvi. 
6 Rei Terada, Feeling in Theory: Emotion after the “Death of the Subject” (Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 2.  
7 Ibid., 9.  
8 Ibid., 56.  
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or derivative phenomena which political discourse would make use of or “manipulate” according to 
strategic necessity. Affectivity, rather, is part of the fabric of the political from the beginning, since 
there can be no communal life in the polis without a minimal “politics of friendship,”9 without the 
common institution of bonds between subjects which both determine and are determined by affect. 
 The source of this latter paradox refers us to my second claim. According to Derrida, the 
subject cannot “experience” affectivity without the structural mediation of technics—a concept which 
intersects with that of technology but which is not entirely reducible to it. One way of rationalizing 
the link between the subject’s synchronic or structural relationship to technics (as the irreducible 
prosthesis which “supplements” all self-identity) and its diachronic or historical relationship to 
technology is by considering the determining role of affectivity in both. If technics and technology 
allow the subject to “bind” itself to itself, to inscribe itself in and as a representation  in the external 
world, this process of binding is never without affective consequences. For Derrida, we shall see, the 
subject’s unconditional relationship to technics is always traversed by its historical relationship to 
technology, that is, to the possibility of an ever-tighter appropriation of sameness or identity and an 
ever more sophisticated protection against the incalculability that threatens this appropriation. In a 
strange double-bind, however, the promise of greater technological protection necessarily brings with 
it a concomitant escalation of the threat or danger, undoing the sense of mastery which technics 
otherwise seems to provide. Hence the constitutive contamination of the two affects to be examined 
here: desire, which seeks to create or reinforce a bond to the other, and anxiety, which dreads its 
potential dissolution. Derrida’s deconstruction of the emotions positions this paradox at the core of 
our affective relationship to others, and to ourselves as others to ourselves.   
  
ANXIETY AND TECHNICS 
 
Derrida’s thinking of affect developed in large part independently of the so-called “affective turn”10 
and its now conventional distinction between “affect” (feelings as somatically or biologically 
determined) and “emotion” (feelings as culturally or socially marked). This is important for a number 
of reasons, perhaps the most significant of which is that Derrida’s use of terms such as émotion or 
sentiment (feeling) tends to be looser and more general than contemporary theory allows. Derrida 
usually reserves the term affect (a somewhat technical French noun rooted in the Affekt of German 
philosophy and psychology) for more academic or theoretical discussions, reflecting the impregnation 
of French philosophical language by the vocabulary of psychoanalysis. This contextual difference is 
borne out, for example, by the greater terminological frequency of émotion in The Work of Mourning, 
a collection of funeral orations, condolence letters, and other memento mori in which Derrida’s 
audience is chiefly public or personal rather than academic.11  
 If Derrida’s use of the term “affect” overlaps at several points with Freudian Affekt, it also 
displaces the latter in a number of important ways. In psychoanalytic theory, affect refers to “the 
qualitative expression of the quantity of instinctual [i.e. drive] energy” attached to a given idea or 
representation (Vorstellung).12 For Freud, affect is “spread over the memory-traces of ideas somewhat 
as an electric charge is spread over the surface of a body”;13 in other words, it qualitatively tinges 
psychical content with feeling (pleasure, pain, desire, anxiety) by binding (binden) itself to a 
particular idea or ideas, a mechanism which facilitates the definition of repression as the active 
separation of ideas from affects. Like Freud, Derrida will hold to a basic distinction between affect 
and “representation” (Vorstellung), or what he more typically calls the “signifier”—a term flexible 
enough to cover psychical or mnemic inscriptions, physical and sonic traces, and so on.14 The key 
                                               
9 Jacques Derrida, The Politics of Friendship (London: Verso, 2005).  
10 Patricia Clough, “The Affective Turn: Political Economy, Biomedia, and Bodies,” in The Affect Theory Reader, 206.  
11 Jacques Derrida, The Work of Mourning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).  
12 Jean Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac Books, 1988), 14.  
13 Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, edited and translated 
by James Strachey and others, 24 vols (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–74) I, 60. Hereafter SE in the text.   
14 At the height of the structuralist vogue, Laplanche and Pontalis note that Vorstellung was increasingly rendered as 
“signifier” (p. 200).  
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differences between Freud and Derrida, however, will converge on the question of the priority of 
affect over the signifier. Instead of affect infusing a signifier with qualitative energy (like “an 
electrical charge,” as Freud suggests), Derrida will argue that it is always possible for affect to be 
invaded by a signifier. 
 In his written appreciation of Barthes’s legacy, “The Deaths of Roland Barthes,” Derrida 
clarifies the porous relationship between affect and signifier through the example of the photographic 
image. Meditating on what Barthes calls the punctum, an ostensibly minor photographic detail which 
cuts through the photo’s objective qualities and transfixes its observer, Derrida writes: “as the place 
of irreplaceable singularity and of the unique referential, the punctum irradiates and, what is most 
surprising, lends itself to metonymy. As soon as it allows itself to be drawn into a network of 
substitutions, it can invade everything, objects as well as affects.”15 If the punctum is definitionally a 
singular phenomenon, it can also be generalized through repetition, hence the image’s metonymic 
power: the woman’s doleful expression is that of my mother and all mothers. In this sense, the 
punctum conforms to the structure of every signifier in general, insofar as it is subject to the rules of 
convention (repetition) without being absolutely determined by them. As singular and repeatable, the 
punctum-signifier can invade not only the object itself (a classically deconstructive argument) but 
also, crucially, our affective relationship to the object. For Derrida affect is structurally predetermined 
by representation, a move which effectively subverts the orthodox metaphysical view of “affect as a 
thematic (of a photograph) or expression (of an independent being).” 16  Affect no longer 
unconditionally precedes and colours our appreciation of a signifier, as though somehow 
“autonomous”17 vis-à-vis the latter, as its natural origin (archē) or aim (telos), but is always already 
bound up with the signifier as technē, with the play of identity and difference involved in every act 
of inscription.  
 In deconstruction, then, affect is a physiological and cognitive state—we physically grieve for 
the lost maternal object recalled to us by the photographic signifier—which is neither fully 
autonomous with respect to the signifier nor fully determined by it. One particular affect plays a 
constitutive role in Derrida’s account of the subject’s relationship to itself, to others, and to the world: 
anxiety. As Derrida’s “To Speculate—on ‘Freud’” affirms, anxiety is indispensable to the subject’s 
prosthetic relationship to technics, i.e. to the technical signifier which “supplements” or stands in for 
a supposedly pre-existing, “natural” self.18 Anxiety is privileged here because it involves not only 
cognitive (as a state of helpless unknowingness, it is both intentional and non-intentional) and 
embodied aspects (it involves behavioural repetition and other distinct physiological markers); it also 
suggests the structural interdependency of the psychical and the somatic. In classical Freudian 
anxiety, the individual attempts to come to terms with a state of cognitive helplessness through 
repetition, something Derrida argues cannot take place without the mediation of technics. Anxiety is 
                                               
15 Derrida, The Work of Mourning, 57. 
16 Brinkema, Forms of the Affects, 90.  
17 In this sense, Derrida’s theory of affect is quite opposed to Massumi’s view of affect as “autonomous” with respect to 
consciousness-dependent process such as meaning, intentionality, belief, cultural content, etc. Massumi’s famous analysis 
of the snowman video experiment in “The Autonomy of Affect” explains the contradictory affective responses (happy-
sad, pleasurable-unpleasurable) of the video’s audience with reference to a “bifurcated” human response system: one 
affective (concerned with the intensity of the images’ effects), the other conventional (responding to the “content” of the 
images as culturally or linguistically determined). Although Ruth Leys’s forceful critique targets Massumi’s 
assumptions—“are not sad films sometimes also pleasurable or enjoyable?” (“The Turn to Affect,” 448)—, she does not 
really propose an alternative explanation of this affective anomaly. Such a model can, I think, be found in Derrida’s theory 
of “binding” (developed below) as the structural contamination of affect and signifier. In this account, the snowman video 
would be lived as “happy-sad” and “pleasurable-unpleasurable” precisely because it dramatizes a paradox at the heart of 
all affective binding of the subject to the other: the bonds which tie us to others are pleasurable in that they yield a sense 
of mastery over the object and over ourselves, but this same process of binding is always haunted by the unpleasurable, 
incalculable possibility of the dissolution of such bonds. Hence the video’s dramatic tension or pathos stems from the 
threat of the snowman’s disappearance (quite literally: melting).  
18 Jacques Derrida, “To Speculate―on ‘Freud”’, in The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1987), 257-410. 
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intrinsic to the process of subjectivation because the subject’s presence-to-self is predicated on an 
ineradicable non-self-identity. As the perpetual deferral of the “present,” différance entails the 
insinuation of an irremediable gap or difference between the subject and its own representations. The 
“present” moment never “arrives” because it is always unseated in its coming-to-be by a future that 
is structurally incalculable.19 It is this very incalculability which motors the subject’s anxiety by 
continually disturbing the otherwise calculating manoeuvres of subjective consciousness. 
 Since Derrida’s thematization of anxiety emerges in dialogue with Freud’s notion of Angst, it 
is instructive to begin with the latter. In the second chapter of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the 
experience of anxiety provides Freud with a diagnostic link between the debilitating trauma suffered 
by soldiers returning from the First World War (“shell-shock”) and the cheerful busyness of a child 
at play. Freud notes that soldiers returning from the trauma of trench warfare often complain of 
“anxiety dreams,” particularly those who have suffered a severe concussion. What he calls the 
“mechanical theory” of trauma forges a causal link between the patient’s neurotic repetition of such 
dreams and physical lesions left by a sudden, intense mechanical force such as a bomb explosion. 
Freud ultimately rejects any explicative model based on the physiological localization of the wound,  
proposing instead that traumatic neurosis, and the debilitating anxiety which accompanies it, is in fact 
caused by a psychical lesion, by a scar left in the virtual topography of the unconscious. In making 
this claim Freud is attempting to explain the origin of both war- and peace-time traumatic neuroses, 
and he will do so by arguing that the “chief weight of causation” lies with the “factor of surprise, of 
fright (Schreck)” (SE, XVIII, 12). 
 A linguistic difficulty must first be surmounted, however. Freud notes a great deal of 
confusion surrounding the way we conventionally talk about affects of apprehension. Three separate 
terms—Schreck, Furcht, and Angst (“fright,” “fear,” and “anxiety”)—are often used interchangeably 
when in fact each refers to a very specific type of apprehension. Schreck (fright) refers to the affect 
experienced when an individual encounters a danger without being prepared for it in any way. Fear 
(Furcht), by contrast, requires a definite object to instil fearfulness in the individual. Anxiety (Angst), 
finally, describes “a particular state of expecting the danger or preparing for it, even though it may be 
an unknown one” (SE, XVIII, 12). Freud thus introduces a strict opposition between a calculating 
anxiety and an unknowing fright, flatly rejecting the possibility that “anxiety can produce a traumatic 
neurosis.” Instead, he emphasizes the element of the unforeseeable as the common and the most 
decisive factor in determining cases of traumatic neurosis since there is “something about anxiety that 
protects its subject against fright and so against fright-neuroses” (SE, XVIII, 13).  
 Freud will later conclude that this “something” is the level of quantity (Quantität) of external 
stimulation received by the organism. Traumatic neurosis is the result of “an extensive breach being 
made in the protective shield [the sense-organs of organisms designed to filter sudden, dangerous 
external excitations] against stimuli” (SE, XVIII, 31). In contrast to the mechanical theory of trauma, 
which regards direct damage to the histological structure of the nervous system as the main causative 
factor, psychoanalysis wants to understand “the effects produced on the organ of the mind by the 
breach in the shield against stimuli.” Two distinct but related affective responses—anxiety and 
fright—play a critical role here. Fright results from the “lack of any preparedness for anxiety,” while 
anxiety corresponds to the hyper-cathexis (Überbesetzung) of the systems which are first to receive 
the stimulus (SE, XVIII, 31). When an individual is in a state of unpreparedness (i.e., when he or she 
is not exhibiting anxiety), the relevant psychical systems are not cathected (energized) to a degree 
which would allow the organism to bind and master the energy in-flowing from the breach in its 
protective shield. Differences in the level of cathexis of the psychical systems will predetermine 
whether the outcome will be traumatic or not. It does not matter whether this level can or cannot be 
calculated by existing scientific methods (Freud concedes that it cannot, at least at present): what 
matters is that the quantity of investment of these psychic systems remains in principle calculable 
(SE, XVIII, 32). In other words, the calculation of an experience’s intensity, and of the corresponding 
                                               
19 The detail of Derrida’s argument can be found in his Voice and Phenomenon: Introduction to the Problem of the Sign 
in Husserl's Phenomenology (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2010), especially Chapters V and VI.  
   6 
level of cathexis of the psychical systems, will eventually allow us to determine, avant or après coup, 
whether the individual will or will not be traumatized. 
 In this quantitative model, anxiety dreams are the mind’s attempt at mastering “stimulus 
retrospectively, by developing the anxiety whose omission was the cause of the traumatic neurosis” 
(SE, XVIII, 32). If the traumatized soldier had originally suffered from anxiety, the trauma would 
never have occurred since anxiety is a state of hyper-preparation for a sudden influx of external 
stimulus (fright). The compulsive repetition of anxiety dreams is a sign, then, not only of the 
quantitative intensity of the original traumatizing experience but also of a desire to master the 
psychical wound by actively (re-)staging the experience in a fresh situation of anxiety. 
 But if repetition is less a state of exception than a “function” (SE, XVIII, 62) fundamental to 
the homeostatic regulation of cathexis, it will be more fruitful to examine a “normal” case of neurotic 
repetition. This, of course, is the famous example of the child’s game of fort-da. This game consisted 
in Freud’s grandson Ernst throwing certain objects into places where they were difficult to retrieve 
and in doing so uttering a cry of “o-o-o-o”—interpreted by Freud as an attempt at articulating the 
word “fort,” the German word for “gone” (SE, XVIII, 14-15). Freud reports witnessing a number of 
variants of the game, the most famous of which involves a spool (Spule), a small block of wood tied 
to a piece of string. Indeed, this version commands the greater part of his attention and consisted in 
Ernst throwing a spool into his curtained cot so that it disappeared from sight. Ernst then pulled the 
spool out of the cot again and hailed its reappearance with a joyful “da” (“there”) (SE, XVIII, 15). 
Freud’s quantitative model places the weight of explanation on an economics of psychical 
compensation. Playing with the spool, and various other implements, rewards the boy for the 
instinctual renunciation required each time his mother is unexpectedly absent. By manipulating the 
mother’s symbolic representation (the piece of wood), by playing at renunciation (fort) and 
satisfaction (da), Ernst compensates himself for the traumatizing effects of these disappearances. By 
calculating these maternal absences, he can effectively master the comings and goings of his own 
anxiety. The game of fort-da thus develops the anxious expectation (i.e., hyper-preparedness for a 
coming shock) which would have prevented the occurrence of the trauma in the first place.  
 The apparent neatness of this model, however, presents a number of unresolved questions. 
Why does the boy’s game continue irrespective of whether or not the mother is physically present? 
And why is the game itself repeated in a number of different forms? Freud himself seems curiously 
unconcerned by obvious variation in the boy’s choice of symbolic object or “toy.” Derrida’s “To 
Speculate—on ‘Freud’” responds to both questions by showing how anxiety is a cognitive and 
physiological response to a structural incalculability that disturbs the essential distinctions of classical 
subjectivity (self/world, psyche/reality, inside/outside, and so on).20 His argument is thus  antipodal 
to Jameson’s claim that the absence of “a self present to do the feeling” entails “a liberation from 
anxiety.”21 In order to show how the affect of anxiety is in fact rooted in the essential non-coherence 
of the classical subject, Derrida’s reading of the fort-da game focuses on the point at which the 
classical antitheses of the subject seem strongest: the frontier between the “natural” interiority of the 
psyche and its technical representation in the external world, encapsulated here by the boy’s 
playthings. Despite obvious differences between versions of the game, what interests Derrida is the 
common structure underlying each variant. In each iteration described by Freud, Ernst is manipulating 
a different technical object, what Derrida collectively refers to as his outils utiles. Far from being 
accessory playthings, these tools accomplish useful psychical work. They form an irreplaceable part 
of the fort-da movement, of the game of distancing and return: 
 
                                               
20 For a synthetic account of anxiety as a philosophical topos, germane to my argument insofar as it locates the affective 
force of anxiety in “a non-something in space and the nothingness of the not-yet in time”, see Chapter 8 of Brinkema’s 
The Forms of the Affects. Drawing on Barthes and Derrida, Brinkema’s claim that “the form of anxiety is a structure in 
process” (p. 191) represents a rejoinder to Massumi’s argument that poststructuralist models remain too beholden to the 
stasis of form and language and are incapable of thinking affect (or intensity) as movement.  
21 Jameson, Postmodernism, 15.  
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 This good little boy, however, had an occasional disturbing habit of taking any small  
 objects he could get hold of and throwing them away from him into a corner, under the bed, 
 and so on, so that hunting for his toys and picking them up was often quite a business (SE, 
 XVIII, 14). 
 
For Freud, we saw, the purpose of these “toys” is to alleviate anxiety by calculating with traumatic 
separation. Although Derrida too highlights the determining role of anxiety, he will place the weight 
of emphasis not on the symbolism of the objects as such but on “the operation of distantiation”: the 
act of throwing the toys, the separation between the boy and the objects to hand.  
 In the complete game, this act of dispersion is always followed by a second act which “consists 
of reassembling [rassemblement: gathering together], of searching in order to bring […] together.”22 
The first version of the game described by Freud, in which the parents collect Ernst’s wandering toys, 
contains two elements common to each subsequent version: a process of rassemblement (bringing 
together) and the presence of a technical object (the Spielzeuges or “playthings”). Derrida’s detailed 
reading shows how each version conforms to a fundamental structure of “autoaffection,” the 
construction of the self through technical re-presentation: “if he separates himself from his Spielzeug 
as if from himself and with the aim of allowing himself to be reassembled [rassemblé: brought 
together, rounded up], it is that he himself is also an aggregate whose reassemblage [réajointement: 
realigning, re-joining] can yield an entire combinatorial of sets.”23 The separation from the self made 
possible by the technical object allows Ernst to gather himself in a movement of rassemblement, to 
gain a semblance of mastery over his own “identity.” Paradoxically, however, it is at this same 
moment of technical supplementation that Ernst becomes a multiplicity of selves (“an aggregate”), a 
disjointed subjectivity whose apparent coherence is both produced and threatened by his interaction 
with these objects. 
 The second version of the game described by Freud involves a different instrument of 
autoaffection, though one which is no less exemplary of the boy’s technical skill (technē): verbal 
articulation. Here Derrida takes up again his well-known deconstruction of the supposedly pure 
interiority of phenomenological consciousness (“the voice that keeps silent”), arguing that the boy’s 
verbal discourse is a technē that is irreducibly exteriorizing.24 This verbal displacement is interpreted 
here not (or not simply) as a constative description of the game of rassemblement (as in Freud’s 
account) but as yet another version of the same game of dispersal and retrieval. The phonic utterance 
provides the minimal exterior inscription or spatialization necessary for the self-overhearing of 
“autoaffection,” performing a self by producing the effect of a “proper” name.25  
 For Freud, the spool version remains the game’s most exemplary example insofar as all 
previous versions involved only the first part of the game (distancing, “fort!”). The wooden block is 
pulled back into view by the boy who locks the cathectic object in sight as a way of assuaging the 
anxiety its loss occasions. It would be a mistake, I think, to privilege this version of the game, as 
Freud does, since both previous iterations (the first involving toys, the second verbal articulation) can 
also be said to involve a movement of return over which the boy has some degree of mastery. Some 
psychical gain is clearly derived from obliging his parents to return his toys to their proper place 
(“hunting for his toys and picking them up was often quite a business,” SE, XVIII, 14), whether it is 
a matter of pleasure, mastery or both. And with Ernst’s repeated articulation of “fort!” and “da!,” 
what counts is less the utterance of the famous double vocable (fort-da: there-here) than the triple 
vocable da-fort-da (here-there-here). The pleasure taken in the play of identity and difference, in 
identity in difference, is less pleasure taken in the difference between “fort” and “da” than pleasure 
taken in the return of a putatively identical “da” after a necessary insinuation of difference (“fort”). 
The repetition of “da” can only ever be an imperfect iteration, however, since the spool which returns 
                                               
22 Derrida, The Post Card, 309. 
23 Ibid.  
24 Derrida, “The Voice that Keeps Silent,” Voice and Phenomenon, 60-74.  
25 Derrida, The Post Card, 312.  
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(“da!”) does not return to precisely the same subject who launched it, a failed homecoming which 
explains the urgency of the game’s narcissistic repetition. 
 Despite this difference-in-repetition, the spool remains a “vehicle” (véhicule): the technical 
vector of a supposedly pre-existing signifiable self.26 Derrida’s use of this word alludes to Freud’s 
strange observation that “it never occurred to him to pull [the spool] along the floor behind him, for 
instance, and play at its being a carriage” (SE, XVIII, 15). This vehicular reference is significant, for 
it will be by scrutinizing its function as a counter-example in Freud’s text—i.e., as a game that is only 
ever da—that Derrida will question the apparent security of the child’s technical investment in 
autoaffection. Derrida reasons that if the piece of wood had been pulled along behind him like a train, 
then the string would be kept “at a distance continuously, but always at the same distance, the length 
of the string remaining constant, making (letting) the thing displace itself at the same time, and in the 
same rhythm, as oneself.”27 In this fictive, counter-factual version of the game, the threat of différance 
as the threat of the future’s unforeseeability would have been eliminated in advance and with it the 
need for repetition and return (“this trained train does not even have to come back [revenir], it does 
not really leave”).28 The risk involved in instituting a space between oneself and one’s representation 
through technics (namely, the risk that the spool-object may not return to the “same” person who 
displaced it) would thus be put out of play, with différance’s incalculability either suppressed entirely 
or reduced to a calculable distance in which the measurable string remains in a state of constant, 
quantifiable tautness. The thrust of Derrida’s reading, however, is to show that the act of technical 
inscription always entails an incalculable risk of self-difference, alterity, and even destruction. And 
it is precisely this threat which arouses our anxiety. 
 Freud refers to a final version of the game in a short footnote. This version is crucial to my 
argument since it sheds valuable light on Derrida’s account of the relationship between anxiety, 
technics, and technology. Freud writes: “the child had found a method of making himself disappear. 
He had discovered his reflection in a full-length mirror which did not quite reach to the ground, so 
that by crouching down he could make his mirror-image ‘gone”’ (SE, XVIII, 15, n.). While this 
iteration simply confirms Freud’s original hypothesis, for Derrida it attests to the specular ambitions 
of the game. The child “plays the utility of the fort/da with something which is no longer an object-
object, [...] with his own ‘bobine’ [spool], with himself as object-subject within the mirror/without 
the mirror.”29 Structurally, the mirror plays the same autoaffective role as each of the previous 
technical objects (toys, voice, spool), but it is also a privileged example because it exemplifies the 
specular aims of all technics: to re-produce the “real” in as unmediated (or im-mediate) a form as 
possible. The mirror’s capacity to reflect an apparently identical self seems to far outstrip the crude 
implements of the earlier iterations of Ernst’s game. The temporizing delay of différance here seems 
at its most diminished and, as a consequence, the boy at his most “alive.” For Derrida, nonetheless, 
the sense of self-presence generated by the mirror’s superior specular capacities is always confounded 
by an inherent spectacularity (the semantic drift or dérive of all self-symbolization). Even the 
technological sophistication of the mirror cannot be put entirely beyond the play (jeu) of différance 
as self-difference or non-propriety. 
 
POLITICS OF AFFECT 
 
The second chapter of Beyond the Pleasure Principle makes a daring pirouette from the “dark and 
dismal” (SE, XVIII, 12) theme of warfare to the sunnier subject of children’s play. The apparent 
incongruity of this shift is justified by a common psychical function which has in both cases been 
subject to obstruction. Later in the text, Freud gives a name to this function: “binding” (Bindung) (SE, 
XVIII, 31). Binding is the process by which freely circulating energy—which in excessive quantities 
can endanger the organism’s survival—is immobilized by “binding” (binden) this affective energy to 
                                               
26 Ibid., 314. 
27 Ibid., 315.  
28 Ibid.. 
29 Derrida, The Post Card, 318. 
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an idea or representation (Vorstellung). In the case of both the trauma of warfare and separation from 
the mother (birth is “the first great anxiety-state”, SE, XIX, 58), what is at stake is a failure to bind a 
sudden, excessive influx of external excitation caused by a “lack of hypercathexis of the systems that 
would be the first to receive the stimulus” (SE, XVIII, 31). The latter, notes Freud, in one of the many 
military metaphors which suffuse his text, represents “the last line of defence of the shield against 
stimuli” (SE, XVIII, 31). 
 Derrida’s reading of Freud places considerable emphasis on the rhetoric of mastery or 
Herrschaft (lordship, domination, rule) underpinning Freud’s hierarchical map of the psychical 
apparatus. To the question of which agency is ultimately in control of psychical life, numerous 
answers are tested and rejected by Freud: from the pleasure principle to its “modification,” the reality 
principle, from the compulsion to repeat to an innate drive towards aggression, destruction, and death. 
The latter, Freud speculates, may be subject to an even more primary drive for mastery 
(Bemächtigungstrieb) (SE, XVIII, 16). This difficulty in enthroning a single psychical sovereign—
every time a likely candidate is found, another appears to contest its authority—provides ready 
material for Derrida’s reflections on the aporetic structure of mastery, what he will, in his more 
explicitly political writings, treat under the heading of “sovereignty.”30 As in his reading of fort-da, 
Derrida will argue that the paradox of mastery, psychical or otherwise, is that it is always predicated 
on the unconditional loss of power entailed by différance. The subject must invest in technical 
supplementation (spatialization) to assert mastery over itself and its surroundings, but in this very act 
of investment it leaves itself vulnerable to being deposed in a future that is structurally uncontrollable. 
 The political repercussions of Beyond the Pleasure Principle are not limited to Freud’s 
militaristic or governmental metaphors, however. Derrida finds in Freud’s account of a hypothetical  
unicellular organism (SE, XVIII, 26-29) a model which accounts not only for the constitution of 
individual subjectivity but also for that of the group or the body politic. The political implications of 
this allegory of the “vesicle” (Blaschen) are registered in the politico-military rhetoric Freud deploys 
to describe its structure. The single-celled organism gradually develops a “protective shield” against 
excessive environmental stimulus, something Freud likens to a border and even a warfront. This 
shield eventually develops into “sense organs” capable of sampling relatively minor “doses” of 
excitation from the outside world, giving the organism valuable information about reality and warning 
it against any impending dangers.31  
 The affective implications of Freud’s vesicle allegory are by no means lost on Derrida. In the 
midst of a cluster of military analogies, Freud describes the state of panic into which the organism is 
plunged when its protective shield is breached and it is unable to prevent a massive influx of 
excitation. As if in a state of terror, the organism’s prevailing hierarchy is suspended, the hitherto 
dominant pleasure principle is put “out of action” (SE, XVIII, 29), and the organism sets in motion 
“every possible defence measure” to contain the sudden invasion of stimulus. A contrapuntal 
psychical charge or “anti-cathexis”32 is deployed to the “front” to bind the incoming excitation.33 But 
this anti-cathexis by definition entails an impoverishment of the other cathected psychical systems, 
forcing the organism to attack itself in order to defend itself, to bind the threat and bring sovereign 
order to a state of panic. 
                                               
30  See, for example, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), where Derrida 
distinguishes between sovereignty (itself structurally dependent on the spatialization of technics) and unconditionality 
(i.e. of différance as temporization, the incalculability which renders us vulnerable towards the future as à-venir) (p.  xiv). 
What links psychical and political mastery here is the relationship between affect and autoaffection, defined as “a taking 
pleasure in the self, a circular and specular autoaffection […]. We must never dissociate the question of desire and of 
pleasure when we treat the political, and especially the democratic, the question of conscious or unconscious pleasure, 
from the calculation and the incalculable to which desire and pleasure give rise” (p. 15). 
31 The Post Card, 347.  
32 “Anti-cathexis” translates the German Gegenbesetzung, for Derrida yet another “strategico-military figure” since one 
of the meanings of Besetzung (cathexis) is “occupation” (p. 348).  
33 On the notion of the “front” and its relationship to the body politic, see Derrida’s remarks on the Front national and its 
foundational rhetoric of the “quasi-biological hygiene of the inviolate national body” (Jacques Derrida and Bernard 
Stiegler, Echographies of Television: Filmed Interviews [Cambridge: Polity, 2002], p. 18). The fictive purity of such a 
front is, he argues, undermined by the structural violation of inside and outside entailed by the deathly technē (p. 18-9). 
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 If this process of binding is crucial to the organism’s integrity, it also refers to the function by 
which the individual links itself to others. For if the traumatic comes from the outside, from a sudden 
influx or invasion of stimulus, it also comes from the interiority of the drives, from the drama of 
unforeseen separation and the sudden breaking of libidinal bonds. The fort-da game calculated with 
the untimely disappearance of the libidinal object (the mother) through the symbolic (Freud) or 
technical (Derrida) representation of these presences/absences. In Group Psychology and the Analysis 
of the Ego, a text roughly contemporaneous with Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud makes the 
difficult transition from individual to mass psychology by arguing that “the essence of a group lies in 
the libidinal ties existing in it” (SE, XVIII, 95-6). Psychoanalysis’s innovation vis-à-vis competing 
accounts of group identity concerns its location of the origin of the group—“of a race, of a nation, of 
a caste, of a profession, of an institution” (SE, XVIII, 70)—in the narrower circle of the family, 
specifically in the libidinal bonds obtaining within it. These bonds are usually rooted in infantile 
experiences of attachment and separation. As Freud notes, the “ambivalent emotional attitudes” 
expressed by crowds are probably related to children’s ambivalent relationship to their nearest and 
dearest, as the affective see-saw of pleasure and unpleasure in fort-da suggests. One key consequence 
of this is a heightening of affectivity in groups, in which the individual’s “liability to affect becomes 
extraordinarily intensified” (SE, XVIII, 88). The “emotional ties” which “constitute the essence of 
the group mind” (SE, XVIII, 91) coalesce around the group leader, a figure of admiration who comes 
to replace the individual’s ego ideal and whom each member of the group shares in a common 
identification. For Freud, this explains the necessity of hierarchical organization in groups such as the 
Church and the Army, yet such libidinal investment in a single sovereign object also brings with it an 
essential danger. For if the object is unexpectedly lost and the corpus is not sufficiently prepared for 
this loss, panic ensues: “the mutual ties have ceased to exist, and a gigantic and senseless fear is set 
free” (SE, XVIII, 96). Such “panic fear” represents the incalculable risk of loss or dissolution which 
for Freud underpins every act of libidinal investment. 
 Like Freud, Derrida locates an irreducible emotional ambivalence—desire for presence, 
anxiety in the face of loss—at the core of the process of binding.34 What he calls the “bindinal 
economy” 35  of différance entails that the act of binding oneself to an object and to others 
(spatialization, inscription, investment: in short, desire) is always threatened by the incalculability of 
potential loss (temporization, delay, difference: the source of anxiety itself). For Derrida there can be 
no desire without this structural anxiety because desire for presence is at the same time anxiety in the 
face of loss. Like Freud, too, Derrida will base his thinking of the group on the ambivalence of binding 
as a function of mastery. As he writes of Freud’s vesicle analogy, its “metaphor can be transferred 
onto every corpus, every organism, every organization”36 and indeed, as we have seen, Freud’s bio-
political analogies already suggest a natural metaphorical transference in this direction. If the process 
of binding always involves a minimal “quota of affect,” then affect must play a key role not only in 
Derrida’s account of individual subjectivity but also in his theory of political subjectivity, of the 
corpus as body politic. 
 Indeed, one of Derrida’s most important political texts, Politics of Friendship, takes as its 
explicit premise the inextricability of affective bonds from the sphere of the political. At first blush, 
the text provides a deconstructive reappraisal of the concept of friendship in political theory and 
philosophy, from Plato to Carl Schmitt. Yet the importance it accords to affect in the history of 
political thought ranges far beyond the mere affection of friends, encompassing a wide range of 
related feelings: Eros, philía, desire, admiration, hatred, anxiety, grief, mourning, loss, and so on. For 
Derrida, bonds of affection between individuals are always threatened by the incalculability of a 
                                               
34 More specifically, Derrida follows Freud in coupling libidinal desire and anxiety in the face of the loss of object, but 
where Derrida finds paradoxical simultaneity Freud sees catabolic transformation or succession: “One of the most 
important results of psychoanalytic research is this discovery that neurotic anxiety arises out of libido, that it is a 
transformation of it, and that it is thus related to it in the same kind of way as vinegar is to wine” (SE, VII, 224). 
35 The Post Card, 389.  
36 The Post Card, 347.  
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world in which these bonds must take root and may also one day be severed. The structural 
incalculability of différance upsets the calculating ideal of enduring equality on which friendship is 
canonically thought to rest, in Aristotle for example, and ensures that there is always something 
asymmetrical or “out-of-joint” in our affection for others.37 While political friendship (idealized in 
the political-personal bond of fraternité) may tie us to the other, it can never do so inextricably and 
irreversibly, since it is an unconditional possibility of such bonds that they may one day come undone. 
The social contract, the signed constitution, the memorandum of understanding are always inscribed 
in the shadow of their potential dissolution which, although it may be subject to calculation, retains 
an irreducible incalculability which can never be neutralized in advance.38  
 It could be objected that such political bonds ultimately rest on the more “original”, “natural”, 
or “immediate” bonds of friendship between individuals and as such are merely derivative or parasitic 
with respect to the latter. In fact, Derrida’s rethinking of friendship as deconstructive of the 
personal/political binary begins by calling the apparent primariness of the fraternal bond into 
question. While the notion of affective bonds between citizens continues to play an important role in 
contemporary political discourse, Derrida argues that repeated emphasis on the “natural” quality of 
these bonds in fact conceals a more fundamental process of conceptual renaturalization.39 One need 
only look to the contemporary paradoxes of globalization to see that the artificiality of concepts such 
as “naturalization” or jus sanguinis is more apparent today than ever before. It is important to note, 
however, that it is not the reality of affective political bonds that Derrida is contesting here, merely 
the idea that these bonds causally stem from natural biological categories, such as a common hair or 
eye colour. If, for Derrida, the natural immediacy of political bonds is always in a sense derived or 
“fictive,” the question remains as to the true source of such bonds. We have already found the answer 
in fort-da: the affective bond can only be constituted through the mediation of technics, through the 
inscription of a calculating signifier which binds us to an other who has always already exceeded and 
escaped this mark. 
 It might seem that Derrida’s “denaturalization” of political affect effectively strips the political 
of its emotional armature and replaces it with a purely technicist or technocratic model of political 
discourse. On the contrary, the increasing importance of technics and technology in the political 
sphere actually has the effect of intensifying the role of affect. This is why Derrida is ultimately 
suspicious of the classical opposition of the personal and the political, something which emerges very 
clearly in his reading of Carl Schmitt in Politics of Friendship. Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political 
attempts to found a concrete theory of the political on the concept of the enemy: “the specific political 
distinction, to which political actions and notions can be reduced, is the distinction between friend 
and enemy.”40 For Derrida, this definition is “classical” insofar as it adheres to a range of oppositions 
intrinsic to political theory since Plato (inside/outside, sameness/otherness, identity/difference), 
which aim at preserving the conceptual integrity of the body politic from an always identifiable or 
localizable “foreign” body. Derrida’s reading of Schmitt thus proceeds by highlighting the aporias 
attendant on this supposedly “pure” definition of the political, several of which converge, crucially, 
on Schmitt’s failure to think politics’s constitutive articulation of affect and technics.   
 Schmitt’s desire to found a rigorous theory of the political on a pure concept of the enemy  (in 
Derrida’s words “only a concrete, concretely determined enemy can awaken the political)41 leads him 
to oppose personal and political concepts of enmity. Schmitt’s enemy is always a “public” enemy; 
                                               
37 Politics of Friendship, 63.  
38 For a close reading of the attachment and dissolution of Anglo-American “political bands,” see Derrida’s “Declarations 
of Independence,” New Political Science, 7, 1, pp.7-15. 
39 “Everything in political discourse that appeals to birth, to nature or to the nation—indeed, to nations or to the universal 
nation of human brotherhood—this entire familialism consists in a renaturalization of this “fiction.” What we are here 
calling ‘fraternization’, is what produces symbolically, conventionally, through authorized engagement, a determined 
politics, which, be it left- or right-wing, alleges a real fraternity or regulates spiritual fraternity. Has anyone ever met a 
brother?” (Politics of Friendship, 93). 
40 The Concept of the Political, tr. George Schwab (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1976), 26. 
41 Politics of Friendship, 138. 
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the notion of a private enemy is in fact fundamentally meaningless: “the enemy is not the competitor 
of the adversary in the general sense of the term. Neither is he the personal, private rival whom one 
hates or feels antipathy for.”42 To assure definitional rigour, Schmitt must strip his concept of the 
political of all aspects which threaten its coherence: “the concept [must] be purified […] of everything 
opposed to the political or the public, beginning with the private: anything that stems from the 
individual or even the psychological, from the subjective in general.”43 In an idealizing move, Schmitt 
attempts to put the political beyond reach of the subjective, starting with what is most synonymous 
with subjectivity: the affects. The principal means of achieving this is by appealing to etymology, to 
the distinction between hostis (the enemy of a political community) and inimicus (private or personal 
enemies), a distinction which Schmitt argues is already operative in Plato’s Republic.44 What is 
ultimately decisive in this distinction is the presence or absence of affect, for the conceptual clarity 
of the political and the public requires that  
 
 sentiments would play no role; there would be neither passion nor affect in general. Here 
 we have a totally pure experience of the friend-enemy in its political essence, purified of any 
 affect—at least of all personal affect, supposing that there could ever be any other kind. If 
 the enemy is the stranger, the war I would wage on him should remain essentially without 
 hatred, without intrinsic xenophobia. And politics would begin with this purification […] 
 war without hatred.45  
 
It is not surprising, then, that Derrida, in contesting this opposition of private affection and public 
rationalism, will appeal to the structural contamination of personal and political entailed by technics. 
The technological revolutions of recent decades have, he points out, only underscored the already 
“threatened, fragile, porous, contestable” nature of the border between public and private,46 a fact 
strikingly evident in the evolution of technologies of warfare, terrorism, and surveillance. The 
conceptual validity of Schmitt’s enemy “axiom,” for instance, has become less secure than ever since 
the Cold War, before increased virtualization began to obscure the figure of the enemy and its 
geopolitical localization. This process has in turn intensified the role played affects such as anxiety 
and terror in political discourse. As exemplary of the increased porosity of public and private, Derrida 
cites the now somewhat forgotten controversy surrounding the “Clipper chip,” a micro-device 
designed to give the United States government access to the telephone-related data of its citizens.47 
Although the chip proved unworkable and was eventually abandoned, the controversy surrounding 
its implementation attests to a fundamental paradox in our relationship to the technē: technics violates 
the frontier between inside and outside, private and public, precisely in order to render this frontier 
more identifiable, more robust, more sovereign. 
 
TECHNOLOGIES OF TERROR 
 
Politics of Friendship concludes that there is no politics that is not also a politics of binding, a politics 
of exploiting the bonds between individuals in the government of the national, international, or 
supranational corpus. The shift in focus from the impossibility of “mastering” individual identity 
(exemplified in Ernst’s fort-da) to the impossibility of the absolute “sovereignty” of a community 
(cultural, linguistic, religious, political) is reflected in a terminological shift in Derrida’s later 
writings. An earlier concern for the emotive drama of “autoaffection” gives way to an increasingly 
pressing insistence on what he will call “autoimmunity.” The simultaneous biological (autoimmunity 
                                               
42 Schmitt, Concept, 28. 
43 Politics of Friendship, 86-7.  
44 Schmitt, Concept, 28, n.9.  
45 Politics of Friendship, 88-9. 
46 Ibid., 88. 
47 Ibid., 144.  
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refers to the paradoxical process by which an organism attacks itself in order to defend itself) and 
political (immunitas grants absolute protection against future prosecution) resonances of the term 
mean it is particularly suited to expressing the contradictions of group identity. Hence 
“autoimmunity” first appears in Derrida’s work with reference to the constitution of religious 
communities, where the bonds of a shared inheritance are linked to divine indemnity and the 
messianicity of the future.48 
 The importance of this quasi-biological trope in Derrida’s later work is rooted in his earlier 
account of Freud’s vesicle allegory, which protects itself against external dangers by deadening its 
outer “shield” and allowing small, immunizing doses of otherwise dangerous excitation to filter 
through its membrane. The underlying continuity between autoaffection and autoimmunity is also 
evident, however, in their shared reliance on technical investment as indispensable to the cycle of 
protection and vulnerability which affects every corpus, whether individual or institutional. If affect 
will again play a key role in Derrida’s later work, it is because the “terrifying and inescapable logic 
of […] autoimmunity” is inextricably caught up with technics and technology.49 
 This terminological substitution is accompanied by a significant reorientation in Derrida’s 
mode of argumentation. While much scholarly ink has been spilled wrangling over a so-called 
“political turn” in Derrida’s later writings, there is a clear shift away from an early detachment from 
the contemporary political sphere to an increasing concern, perhaps dateable to 1994’s Specters of 
Marx, with the “actuality” of global politics. A brief reference to the Clipper chip affair excepted, the 
Derrida of Politics of Friendship (a text also published in 1994 but incorporating seminars given in 
1988-1989) was still able to justify his studied avoidance of “illustrations [taken] from the most 
spectacular ‘news’ on political scenes: local, national, European or worldwide” out of a concern for 
dispassionate “sobriety,” a desire not “to exploit that which, as it were, screens out reflection by 
projecting itself with the pathetic and ‘sensational’ violence of images on to a too easily mediatizable 
scene.”50 Such resolve, we shall see, was soon abandoned. 
 Part of my argument here is that Derrida’s late turn towards the contemporary “political scene” 
is motivated by a growing need to clarify the relationship between our structural dependence on 
technics and our historical relationship to technology. As the passage just cited suggests, this 
realization brings with it increased emphasis on the role of affect in political discourse, with the link 
between technical or specular re-presentation (the relationship between the “screen” and the “too 
easily mediatizable scene”) and the affective (“the pathetic and ‘sensational’ violence of images”) 
becoming steadily more imperative, particularly in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. 
It is natural then that Derrida, in his response to 9/11, first in “Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic 
Suicides” and later in Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, will one again turn to psychoanalysis to 
interrogate the relationship between affects of apprehension, technology, and terrorism. A key 
concern of these texts will be the way in which terrorism depends on technology as a means of 
exploiting individual fears (hence its “-ism”), just as governments are in turn dependent on the 
autoimmunity of the technē in their struggle against terrorist organizations. Although designed to 
alleviate our anxiety in the face of potential dangers, technologies of defense can just as easily 
intensify our anxieties. In stark contrast to Schmitt’s desire to purge the political of the regional 
discipline of psychology, Derrida’s provocative claim in Rogues is that our understanding of politics 
depends on our capacity to “reckon (compter) with the logic of the unconscious,” a phrase which 
signals the importance he will once again place on values of (in)calculability in understanding 
affective life.51 One could even say that these late reflections on the body politic proceed by aligning 
Freud’s theory of psychical defense mechanisms (fort-da) with political mechanisms of defense, the 
                                               
48 Derrida, Acts of Religion (London & New York: Routledge, 2002), 87. 
49 Ibid., 80, n.2 (emphasis my own). 
50 Politics of Friendship, 272.  
51 Derrida, Rogues. Two Essays on Reason (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 157.  
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means by which nation states attempt to preserve and maximize their sovereign power through 
increasingly sophisticated technical savoir.52 
 Technology’s role in calculating with the future forms a major motif of Derrida’s response to 
the 9/11 attacks. As he tells Borradori, “from the very first televized images, those of CNN, […], it 
was easy to foresee (prévoir) that this was going to become, in the eyes of the world, what you called 
a ‘major event.’ Even if what was to follow remained, to a certain extent, invisible and 
unforeseeable.”53 If everyday language places a premium on visual metonymies of prediction, this is 
because witnessing is always haunted by an irreducible incalculability (even the immediate future 
remains “invisible” or “unforeseeable”). The privilege accorded to the calculation of spatial and 
temporal presence extends beyond everyday linguistic usage, however. Calculation also forms a 
fundamental part of our concept of psychical trauma. In Derrida’s interview with Borradori and in 
Rogues, the traumatic character of 9/11 provides a forceful example of how a classical concept of 
trauma—i.e. one based on the calculable quantity or intensity of a wound, encompassing both 
“mechanical” and psychoanalytic theories of trauma—continues to influence our current 
understanding of terrorism. Derrida’s discussion of the intensification of affect as the immediate aim 
of terrorism can here be read, I think, as an implicit critique of Freud’s argument for the inherent 
possibility of calculating quantitative levels of anxiety, that is, of articulating a direct proportionality 
between a quantity of excitation and the quality of an affect. Derrida will equate the “state of anxiety” 
which results from suffering a trauma (here a large-scale terrorist attack) not with the calculable 
intensity of an unexpected and violent past experience (as in a classical Freudian model), but with the 
incalculability of a future in which an event could occur which would be unquantifiably worse than 
the one suffered in the past. It is this incalculability which is ultimately determinative of affect:  
 
 However much one may try to contain the effects of September 11, there are many clear 
 indications that if there was a trauma on that day, in the United States and throughout the 
 world, it consisted not, as is too often believed of trauma in general, in an effect, in a wound 
 produced by what had effectively already happened, what had just actually happened, and 
 risked being repeated one more time, but in the undeniable fear or apprehension of a threat 
 that is worse and still to come. The trauma remains traumatizing and incurable because it 
 comes from the future.54 
 
This rather remarkable claim is reinforced by a concrete thought experiment. Derrida asks us to 
imagine, in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Towers, that reassurance were possible 
that the violence of the attacks had come to an end and that there would never again be such an event 
on such a catastrophic scale.55 If it were possible to calculate infallibly with the future in this way, 
the process of mourning could be concluded in a relatively short amount of time. Yet this in no way 
corresponds to what actually happened in the weeks and months following the attacks, a period in 
which the vulnerability of the body politic was actively exploited by competing ideological interests 
stressing “the threat of the worst to come” rather than “an aggression that is ‘over and done with.’”56 
 Despite or perhaps because of this structural link between affect and incalculability, 
contemporary notions of terror and terrorism remain strikingly committed to the language of 
calculation and quantity. Terrorists, for instance, almost always justify the brutality of their attacks 
through an economics of revenge, of violence and counter-violence. A terrorist act, Derrida notes, 
usually presents itself as “a response in a situation that continues to escalate” (dans une situation de 
                                               
52 In Rogues, savoir (technoscientific knowledge) is structurally linked to voir (seeing) and prévoir (foreseeing), to the 
calculation of a future withdrawn from absolute calculation (p. 128). 
53 Derrida, “Autoimmunity,” 109 (emphasis my own, with the exception of “in the eyes”). 
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surenchère: in a situation of reciprocal outbidding).57 It is because of the previously inflicted violence 
of an aggressor-state that the counter-violence of the terrorist attack must be even worse, or at the 
very least equal, to the past wound. The same logic of calculability underpins common accusations 
against powers such as the United States and Israel that they are “more terrorist” than the terrorists 
themselves.58 Yet even a cursory examination of the evidence shows that comparable quantities of 
violence do not always (indeed rarely do) produce equal levels of anxiety: “quantitatively comparable 
killings, or even those greater in number, whether immediate or indirect, never produce such an 
intense upheaval when they occur outside European or American space (Cambodia, Rwanda, 
Palestine, Iraq, and so on).”59  
 Why is this so? In the fort-da game, we saw, the fundamental disequilibrium between 
qualitative (affect) and quantitative (calculability) stemmed from a congenital dependency on 
technics, the means by which we ordinarily circumscribe or calculate with the incalculable. This 
disequilibrium explains why Derrida, in his late writings, places particular emphasis on the role of 
technologies of communication in determining our “experience” of affect, notably those which 
exemplify the specular and spectacular dimensions of all technics. For Derrida, mass media news 
reporting is essential to the success of terrorism since terrorist attacks always aim at producing a 
maximum of quality (anxiety, fear, dread) from a minimum of quantitative violence. This requires 
the active exploitation of media communication networks as a means of accentuating the spectacular 
or theatrical dimensions of what appears to be merely a neutral or specular act of reporting. Terrorism 
attempts to unsettle the calculating and therefore reassuringly spatialized/temporalized aspect of the 
latter (who, what, where, when, why) by drawing on the incalculable imaginative drift of the 
spectacular or the symbolic. In the case of September 11, it was the symbolic heads of capitalism (the 
Twin Towers) and government (Washington) that were set apart as privileged targets, in order to 
trigger a maximum number of “psychic effects (conscious or unconscious) and symbolic or 
symptomatic reactions.”60 Such affective capitalization on the spectacular structure of news reporting 
explains why the putting to death of thousands of people in a short amount of time can provoke fewer 
and less intense psychical and political effects than the murder of a single individual in a single 
country “with highly developed media resources.” 61  By pre-conditioning our apparently 
“autonomous” affective response to terrorist violence, technics entails that there can never be a 
rigorously calculable correspondence between the numbers of deaths (or extent of damage inflicted), 
the trauma suffered, and the affect “provoked.” 
 The last half century has seen the conventional link between “terrorism”, “territory”, and 
“terror” radically put in question by accelerated technological transformations. 62  These 
transformations have, on the one hand, alleviated our anxieties insofar as we are now under the 
protection of ever-more sophisticated technologies of calculating the real (satellite and video-link 
communication, digital passport control, advanced missile defense systems, and so on). On the other 
hand, they have also intensified such feelings, notably with regard to the increasingly non-localized 
or virtualized nature of our relationship to technology. This is particularly the case for contemporary 
practices of terrorism, where the historical link between terrorism and territorial localization (in 
nationalist movements, for instance) has given way to the increased obsolescence of physical locality 
in the planning and execution of terrorist attacks. As Derrida points out, terrorists are no longer 
dependent on “crude” technologies such as planes and bombs; they can now deploy computer viruses 
capable of paralyzing the economic, military, and political resources of an entire state. It is thus not 
only physical buildings which are now vulnerable to attack but also “the computer and informational 
networks on which the entire life (social, economic, military, and so on) of a great nation, of the 
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greatest power on earth, depends.”63 The advent of microbiological warfare may indeed render the 
physical spectacle of terrorism obsolete, replacing it with “invisible” or “uncontrollable” threats 
which will only aggravate our anxiety in the face of potential suffering and loss: “nanotechnologies 
of all sorts are so much more powerful and invisible, uncontrollable, capable of creeping in 
everywhere. […] Yet out unconscious is already aware of this; it already knows it, and that’s what’s 
frightening [c’est ce qui fait peur].”64  
 This emphasis on uncontrollability is critical, for it points to a constant theme in Derrida’s 
later work: the intrinsically unmasterable nature of our relationship to technology, an argument which 
has significant consequences for the deconstruction of state sovereignty. Since the collapse of the 
USSR as a superpower, widespread anxiety in the face of a terrorist attack has intensified following 
the arming of “rogue states” by leading Western powers. Such states have proven to be largely 
unpredictable in their pursuit of sophisticated, often nuclear weapons. At the same time, it is 
becoming less and less possible to confine these “rogue” threats to a single geographical location, in 
which “organized, stable, identifiable” powers are “localizable” and “territorialized.”65 During the 
Cold War, two apparently equal forces were locked in a strategy of game theory, which provided at 
least a semblance of calculability to the conflict’s escalating sequence of wagers (surenchères); since 
9/11, however, it has been more and more difficult to counter-balance and thereby neutralize a 
terrorist threat that by its very nature cannot be absolutely localized to a single nation state. 
 The sense of vulnerability generated by this decreasing calculability requires a concurrent 
increase in the military (i.e. technoscientific) preparedness of the US and other so-called “target” 
nations. As in Freud’s theory of anxiety as a state of hyper-preparedness for trauma, the calculating 
function of technics is crucial here. In Rogues, the same necessity of self-protection which petrified 
the protective shield of Freud’s vesicle is at work in technologies which reinforce the national border 
of the United States and expel (or keep out) all that is threatening to it. We have already seen, 
however, how the autoimmunity of technics means that the frontier between inside and outside, 
domestic and foreign is always susceptible to contamination. Derrida provides a striking example of 
this unconditional vulnerability in his discussion of the discrepancy between the conceptual 
vagueness of official definitions of “rogue states” and a projected $60 billion to be spent by the US 
government on an anti-missile missile defence system to protect against the unpredictability of such 
states.66 The very notion of an anti-missile missile defence system exemplifies the double bind of 
protection-vulnerability which conditions our relationship to the technē. In order to immunize the 
corpus against unknown “external” threats, the body politic deploys highly sophisticated technical 
means of forestalling a missile attack by establishing its own system of preventative, sometimes 
nuclear force. In doing so, however, the corpus also attacks its own defenses since it leaves itself 
vulnerable not only to the irreducible unpredictability of such technologies (as ongoing debates 
surrounding Fukushima and nuclear power more generally attest) but also to their hijacking by 
terrorist threats “interior” to the body politic itself. Like the originary Promethean savoir of fire, 
nuclear power is an exemplary technē which, once “stolen,” produces effects which are as potentially 
beneficial as they are potentially harmful. 
 The status of the technē as a “drug” (pharmakon) for anxiety, both affective poison and its 
ineffective antidote, is linked to its simultaneous specular and spectacular qualities. For Derrida, the 
specular aspect of technics (its ability to relay a “presence” that is putatively self-identical) is  always 
undercut by the irreducibly spectacularizing nature of the technical medium. The latter means that we 
must be continually vigilant with regard to the ostensible “neutrality” of the act of communication, 
what Derrida elsewhere refers to as the “artifactual” quality of news reporting.67 In his interview with 
Borradori, Derrida develops his account of the spec(tac)ularity of technics by examining media 
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responses to 9/11, in particular the compulsiveness with which footage of the towers’ collapse was 
repeated on loop (en boucle) in the days and weeks following September 11. Like the looped “lasso”68 
deployed by Ernst in his game of fort-da, this tele-technological “loop” is vital to understanding our 
affective investment in the attacks. “Direct” televisual images of the “slashing open” and “collapse” 
of the Twin Towers were reproduced and repeated throughout the world with a sense of specular 
immediacy, as though they were being received for the first time, through ‘“live transmission.’”69 
This illusion of specularity was, however, structurally undermined by the irreducible gap, distance, 
or delay (différance) between the inscription of the event as re-presentation and the eventual 
interpretation of this inscription. As Derrida puts it in Echographies, “real time is simply an extremely 
reduced ‘différance,’ […] there is no purely real time because temporalization itself is structured by 
a play of retention or of protention and, consequently, of traces.”70 This oscillation of temporo-spatial 
proximity and distance structured our interaction with the signifier-images of destruction and explains 
why they were circulated with such intensity by national and international media, like a “film that 
runs and reruns ceaselessly on screens across the entire world.”71 Our horrified viewing of the footage 
involved a delicate play (jeu) of pleasure and unpleasure, of fort (distance, “there”) and da (proximity, 
“here”): “a frightening, frightened, terrified pain […] bound up with an unavowable elation 
(jouissance), one that is all the more unavowable, uncontrollable, and irrepressible insofar as it 
operates at a distance, neutralizing the reality and thus keeping it at bay.”72 The looped (en boucle) 
images abreact accumulated anxious tension by localizing the event in time and space (the events 
were “there”: calculable, finite, closed or bouclé in French), but they also aggravated our 
apprehension in the face of an incalculable future in which the bonds (boucles) tying us to ourselves 
and to others could one day be violently severed. It is always possible that an attack might take place 
“here,” even if we cannot calculate exactly where or when.  
 The structural paradox of technics is thus that it “at once confirms and neutralizes the effect 
of […] reality.”73 If there was something inherently reassuring in the specular act of repeating the 
“real” of the attacks, this repetition was not a retroactive attempt at “mastering” the traumatism of a 
past wound (as in Freud’s theory of anxiety), but was rather an attempt at guarding against the shock 
of the future itself, whose repressed incalculability had suddenly returned in a moment of unforeseen 
violence.74 At the same time, this specular desire for closure was frustrated by the media's affective 
accentuation—for commercial, ideological, or political reasons—of the spectacular quality of the 
images, of the anxious vulnerability that had suddenly been exposed.  
 Our affective engagement with such images of suffering exemplifies Derrida’s argument for 
the untenability of a conception of the political divorced from the affective lives of individuals. This 
inextricability is exemplified in the quasi-obligation facing every politician in the wake of a national 
trauma such as September 11: “public” displays of mourning must always evince a “private” 
affectivity, the ability to affect and be affected by traumatizing events. While such pathos is never 
without a share of cathartic yield, the technical reproduction of images of violence and grief also 
opens the realm of the political as a region in which putatively “private” affect is abreacted or 
intensified in the act of “transmission.” It is important to be clear here, however: what Derrida is not 
proposing is a theory of political affect in which feelings such as anxiety, fear or terror are susceptible 
to straightforward “manipulation” by competing ideological interests. The latter would imply that 
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such feelings can be experienced in an “immediate”, “natural” or “autonomous” state before being 
subject to subsequent political or ideological manipulation. On the contrary, Derrida’s concept of 
technics entails that our relationship to ourselves and to others is always already mediated or 
“framed.” 75  This structural dependency on technics means that affect is always already pre-
conditioned by fluctuations of intensity which vary in function of the particular technological medium 
in question—a variance usefully illustrated by Ernst’s sampling of different technical objects.  
 This explains why Derrida, when directly addressing the problem of political affect, always 
eschews a vocabulary of “manipulation” or “perversion” and prefers instead the more precise notion 
of “exploitation.” In Echographies, for instance, the Front national’s rhetoric of a culturally and 
racially “pure” body politic is said to “exploit” the fear of the body’s invasion by that which is foreign 
to it.76 Conversely, in Politics of Friendship, we saw, Derrida is determined not “to exploit that which, 
as it were, screens out reflection by projecting itself with the pathetic and ‘sensational’ violence of 
images on to a too easily mediatizable scene.” The term is well chosen, for etymologically 
“exploitation” suggests a process both of unfolding or ex-pli-cation (thus of imposing univocal 
meaning where there is complexity and difference) and of military capturing (as an image is often 
said to “capture” our attention). This idea of capture returns us to Freud’s fundamental notion of 
Besetzung (“military occupation”), the cathexis by which the energy of affect is “bound” to a 
representation such as a word, object, image, or memory-trace. For Derrida, we have seen, this the 
act of binding the energy of affect to a signifier is always haunted by the potential dissolution of the 
bonds which tie us to others. What deconstruction shows us is that there can be no sovereign 
movement of binding that would be free of this anxiety of unbinding, of a feeling of unconditional 
powerlessness over ourselves and others. Our engagement with friends, lovers, families, fellow 
citizens is thus always agonized by the same affective double bind: however passionate our 
investment in others may be, this investment is as fragile and volatile as politics itself.  
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